

# Scalable Security using SAM and CSP

Session: Hardwarebasierte Vertrauensanker für die europäische eID Technologie

Tobias Damm, BSI - Referat TK11 – Chip Security

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# Digital Identities on mobile platforms ...

## Goals:


- Ease of use
- High functionality
- Broad availability
- New use cases
- Much more ...

## Common questions:

- Use case (What?)
- Regulation (Who?)
- Acceptance (Why?)
- **Implementation (How?!)**



# ... designed secure !



## Security by certification

- Verifiability
- Documented security assertion
- Highest security guarantees by using dedicated hardware (EAL 4+, VAN.5 highly avail.)

eIDAS 'high'

## Challenging constraints:

- Mobile devices are complex
- Heterogeneous market (many OEMs & devices)
- High number of involved parties (OEMs, MNOs, Service Providers, ...)

Implementation: Secure, Scalable, Available, Economical ?

## Two contributions

①

### Secured Applications for Mobile (SAM)

organizational & technical approach for the reduction of dependencies regarding the life cycle

②

### Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP)

organizational & technical approach for secure implementation and reduction of certification requirements

## Secured Applications for Mobile – Use Case

*The Secured Applications for Mobile specification defines a capability allowing cellular connected Devices to use a wide range of secured applets within an eUICC. Such applets can be managed by a service provider, and may be paired with applications running in the Device itself.*


*- GSMA SAM v1.1*

Use case / process (here: eID):

1. Download und install an app of the Application Service Providers (ASP) into Rich-OS.
2. Evaluation (by the app) if platform and eUICC are eligible (availability, version, storage space, etc.).
3. If positive: Register at ASP and in the SAM-SD of the eUICC.
4. Install the appropriate eID-applet into the SAM-SD. Transfer rights to ASP.
5. Personalize the eID-applet with user data (utilizing e.g. the physical eID-card).
6. Secure use of the eID functionality.

# Challenge: Accessing the eSE / eSIM


eID in eSE



## Dependencies on OEM

Access to embedded Secure Elements (eSE) only possible via interfaces of the device manufacturer.

eID in MNO-Profile on eSIM




## Dependencies on MNO

Access to eUICC/eSIM only possible via interfaces of the mobile network operator (MNO).

- Accessing the dedicated hardware to use secured applications is typically very restrictive and limited.
- Need to use OEM- and MNO- specific interfaces and background systems.

# SAM as foundation for third party applications on eSE / eSIM


eID in eSE



## Dependencies on OEM

Access to embedded Secure Elements (eSE) only possible via interfaces of the device manufacturer.


eID in MNO-Profile on eSIM



## Dependencies on MNO

Access to eUICC/eSIM only possible via interfaces of the mobile network operator (MNO).

eID in SAM-SD besides MNO-Profile (eSIM) or Issuer SD (eSE)



## Reduced dependencies

Access to SAM-SD on eSE / eUICC via SAM management systems and SAM-PKI.

## Two contributions

①

### Secured Applications for Mobile (SAM)

organizational & technical approach for the reduction of dependencies regarding the life cycle

②

### Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP)


organizational & technical approach for secure implementation and reduction of certification requirements



# Scalability of security certifications


‘Composite evaluation’ for high assurance classes

- High effort (financial & time-wise)
- Requires deep understanding of the platform (requirements & restrictions)
- Limited usability of the platform certificate (18 months)
- Static assurance class, low modularity
- Low scalability



No ideal fit for products in heterogeneous markets with short product cycles


# Applications



Applications require secure implementations of identical cryptographic building blocks:

- Secure key management for ID and Auth
- Secure storage for user data
- Authentication protocols
- Secure and Trusted channels, e.g. to back-end
- Signatures
- Secure Personalization
- Secure Erase and Termination

# CSP Concept: More than a Crypto-Lib !



## CSP goals:

- Separation of business logic and crypto
- Ease scalable certification efforts (eliminate composite certification!)
- Provide complete building blocks and protocols for **the full life cycle**
- Prevent misuse of cryptography

## CSP Functional Requirements (excerpt):

(derived from BSI-CC-PP-0104 & BSI TR-03181 CSP2)

- key management
- identification and authentication
- session handling
- signing
- secure storage (wrapped import/export)
- encryption
- attestation

## CSP utilization since 2020

Security modules (TSS / TSE) for cash registers in Germany:

- > 2 M cash registers
- > 2.000 cash register manufacturers
- 6 certified TSS (+ variants)
- 4 certified CSP, incl. 2 SE (1 JavaCard)

Rewe Markt GmbH Weberstr. 118 53113 Bonn UID Nr.: DE812706034			
		EUR	
KAFFEESAHNE 10%		0,79	B
KIND. SCHOKOBONS		4,39	B
SUMME		EUR	5,18
Geg. BAR		EUR	20,00
Rückgeld BAR		EUR	14,82
Steuer %	Netto	Steuer	Brutto
B= 7,0%	4,84	0,34	5,18
Gesamtbetrag	4,84	0,34	5,18
TSE-Signatur: Ypp6n7GlrCh1Sz70XYdndiLv+2oxfitLd 9Q3/TnM2HBI1bULgIea+ngUofQws2odLL qYogDwVVGK5FUabEsneLV54Ty8XJ+mBRI ugV0+JuLkdQ1kBN7AvSbsPhEpJ+XI			
TSE-Signaturzähler: 1045446			
TSE-Transaktion: 499773			
TSE-Start: 2023-01-18T08:38:27.000			
TSE-Stop: 2023-01-18T08:38:32.000			
Seriennummer Kasse: REWE:00:01:2e:5f:a4:27:00			
18.01.2023 08:38		Bon-Nr.: 1873	
Markt: 0094		Kasse: 3 Bed.: 282828	
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# Thank you for your attention!

## Contact

Tobias Damm  
Division TK11 – Chip Security

Tobias.damm@bsi.bund.de

Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)  
Godesberger Allee 87  
53175 Bonn  
[www.bsi.bund.de](http://www.bsi.bund.de)



BSI as the Federal Cyber Security Authority shapes information security in digitalization through prevention, detection and response for government, business and society.



# Current State, Literature, and Further Readings

# SAM & CSP: From Concepts to Standards

Current state on SAM:

- SAM Requirements document published by GSMA in June 2021
- SAM Configuration (technical specification document) in final phase at GlobalPlatform
- SAM PKI and PKI policy in discussion with multiple actors

Current state on CSP:

- BSI Technical Guideline TR-03181 – CSP2 published in June 2023
- technical specification currently under work at GlobalPlatform, to be published as amendment to the GP Card Specification, „Amendment N – CSP“

# SAM & CSP: Literature

- BSI overview page with links to BSI SAM Position Paper, CSP Whitepaper, BSI TR-03181  
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/secureelements>
- SAM Requirements document by GSMA  
[https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/gsma\\_resources/sam-01-secured-applications-for-mobile-requirements/](https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/gsma_resources/sam-01-secured-applications-for-mobile-requirements/)
- SAM Position Paper by Eurosmart  
<https://www.eurosmart.com/european-mobile-identity-recommendations-on-sam-technology/>
- SAM Position Paper by TCA  
[https://trustedconnectivityalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/TCA\\_SAM\\_PositionPaper\\_FINAL.pdf](https://trustedconnectivityalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/TCA_SAM_PositionPaper_FINAL.pdf)
- Digital Wallet  
[https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-digital-identity\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-digital-identity_en)