

# Transition to PQC – A Reality Check

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# Agenda

Reality Check & Real World Experiences

Challenge:  
Stateful Hash Based Signatures

References






1. Quantum Computer poses a threat to current cryptography
2. Post Quantum Cryptography to thwart the **Quantum Threat**
3. Migration to Post Quantum Cryptography is complex

## Why should I deal with PQC now?

## Requirements and Timeline

### CNSA 2.0 Timeline

-  Exclusive use of CNSA Suite 2.0
-  CNSA Suite 2.0 default and preferred
-  Option and testing


### NIST IR 8547 Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards

#### Algorithms Deprecated

- Elliptic Curve DH and MQC  
(112 bits security strength)
- Finite Field DH and MQV  
(112 bits security strength)
- RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA  
(112 bits security strength)

#### Algorithms Disallowed

- Elliptic Curve DH and MQC
- Finite Field DH and MQV
- RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA



## White House - Securing Our Nation With Post Quantum Cryptography

January & August 2024

White House Round Table PQC

White House Round Table PQC

Utimaco Post Quantum Cryptography expert invited to the White House



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Analysts



Collaboration


NIST



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik



Intellectual Property






# Case Study PQC for Chip Manufacturer

Applying quantum security for a large chip manufacturer


- ◆ **Use Case:** Quantum-secure device attestation
- ◆ **Customer:** Global semiconductor designer and manufacturer



Applying Quantum Security to Chips






  Cryptographic key injection of Public PQC Key (ML-DSA and LMS) during the production process

Chips are used in a variety of use cases and devices and need to be long-term secure.



  Secure, authenticated firmware updates with signed certificates via private PQC key (ML-DSA, LMS)

   Generation of asymmetric key pairs based on ML-DSA, LMS with Utimaco HSM and PQC firmware extension

Enables hybrid signatures

# Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes



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## Advantages of stateful hash-based signature schemes



Mature and proven algorithms



High level of security




Relatively small public keys make them simple, fast, and efficient



Signing and verification require minimal computation effort



Can be used as standalone algorithm (no need for a hybrid implementation)




## Challenges:

- 1) Limited number of keys
- 2) Handling the state (tracking OTS)




## Backup & Restore

- ◆ Classical Backup & Restore procedures restore an old state -> violate the security requirement!



Stateful Hash-Based Algorithms are great – but distributed environments cause a challenge



## Challenge:

Development from centralized to decentralized use case

## Decentralized use cases

- ◆ Multi site implementation
- ◆ State handling is complicated
- ◆ Example: Global Automotive supplier



Trust relationship between HSMs



OTS preserving communication between HSMs



Local state management



- ◆ HSMs are still passive components
- ◆ Application is actively driving the logic (not the security!)

Security is Paramount: No OTS Key re-use

## Design Properties of a Secure State Handling Architecture

### Security View



**Comprehensive security design** - All security should be managed inside of an HSM.



**Separate key information and state information** - knowing a key vs. using a key



**Authentic and confidential end-to-end transfer of key and state information** - Do not use algorithms with less maturity.



**Establish a reliable trust relationship between the HSM instances** - Allows a highly flexible and secure transfer even during operating in the field.



**Prevent replays**  
- protect the freshness

### Operators View



**Prepare for offline data** - allow external storage of transfer messages (until delivery)



**Asynchronous** - no need for direct (real time) communication between HSMs




**No static setup** - flexible adaption of trust relationship



**No Master – Slave**  
- avoid single points of failure



**Generic** - no dependency to algorithm / key generation method



1. **Setup phase** (set up trust relationship)
2. Generate key in HQ
3. Distribute subsets to destinations
4. Operate ...
  1. If risk of key exhaustion at one site - Securely transfer keys from other site(s)
  2. If site will be shut down - Securely transfer remaining keys to other site(s)
  3. Attacks blocked, e.g., Replay key transfer
  4. Risk of faulty app exhausting all keys - only import small portions of the key; keep rest offline
  5. If HSM is destroyed -> loss is limited to a well-defined subset of the key
5. Add / remove HSM from Trust relationship

- - Trust boundary

..... Logical connection (network, portable storage, ...)




External key storage (optional)

# Secure and Transparent State Handling

## State Management Policy

- ◆ defines rules for state management
- ◆ based on OTS preserving framework
- ◆ application view: like stateless
- ◆ operator view: full flexibility & automation



Application


„Stateless“

Smart Scheduler

SM policy

Smart Scheduler

SM policy



Fully automated support

Operator

- ◆ Address PQC now!
- ◆ Challenges can be solved – security and operational aspects
- ◆ OTS preserving Framework & State Management Policy  
=> practical stateful hashbased signatures



# Selected References

 PQC State and Mitigation	 PQC Integration Study	 PQC FAQs	 PQC Migration Handbook	 NIST SP 800-208	 NIST IR 8547
 Quantum Computer Development	 BSI TR-02102-1 (in German)	 Quantum Computing Information Page		 FIPS 203	 Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography
 PQC Information	 CNSA 2.0 CNSA 2.0 FAQ	 PQC Strategies		 FIPS 204	

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# Thank you for your attention!



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